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Abstract 
This article examines the criminalisation of the reckless transmission of disease in England and 
Wales. The defence of consent to bodily harm and the principle of informed consent are crucial 
to the foundations of this discussion. This defence gives an HIV infected party freedom to behave 
recklessly and rely on the knowledge of the victim as a defence for their reckless behaviour. The 
criminal recklessness of an HIV infected party has also been argued to be negated by the careful 
use of precautionary measures during sexual activity. This means that an infected party can 
engage in sexual activity in the absence of full disclosure of their condition to their sexual partner. 
This promotes neither honesty nor openness. In fact, it encourages deceit and dishonesty. The 
current law on the reckless transmission of disease remains unclear. However, careful analysis 
of the legal and moral debates surrounding reckless transmission of disease will aid discussion 
about the future development of this area of law. 
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Introduction 
Since the landmark case of R v Dica2 in 2004, it is now accepted that the most appropriate ground 
for convicting the reckless transmission of the HIV virus is under section 20 of the Offences 
Against the Person Act 1861.3 Since Dica, there has been extensive academic debate 
surrounding the rationality of including transmission of disease within the OAPA 1861. The case 
of R v Clarence4 was the leading case for over a century on the issue of whether transmission of 
                                            
1 James graduated with a first class LLB honours and is currently work as part of a Personal Injury team 
in a Plymouth based law firm and anticipates undertaking the Legal Practice Course in 2017. 
2 [2004] Q.B. 1257. 
3 For the purposes of this article the Offences against the Person Act 1861 will be referred to as ‘OAPA 
1861’. 
4 (1888) 22 Q.B.D. 23. 
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disease represented an offence under the OAPA 1861. Clarence had sexual intercourse with his 
wife knowing that he was infected with gonorrhoea. He transmitted the disease and was convicted 
under section 20 of the OAPA 1861. Clarence appealed and his conviction was quashed. Stephen 
J considered the act of infecting someone with gonorrhoea was different from a violent blow or 
cut described in the statutory definition of section 20 of the OAPA 1861.5  
In the more recent case of R v Dica the defendant who knew he was HIV positive had unprotected 
sexual intercourse with two women, both of whom contracted the virus. In Dica Judge L.J. stated 
that ‘if psychiatric injury [as seen in Ireland and Burstow6] can be inflicted without direct or indirect 
violence… physical injury may similarly be inflicted’7 in the absence of direct or indirect violence. 
Dica therefore ruled that transmitting disease is to cause physical injury and can be inflicted with 
or without direct or indirect violence. Clarence was consequentially overruled and it was 
commented in Dica that, ‘if that case [Clarence] were decided today the conviction under section 
20 would be upheld8’.  
 
In analysing the development of this area of law, the first issue is the availability of the defence of 
consent. This will be followed by an analysis of the defendant’s and the victim’s knowledge of 
infection, and what possible effects this may have on criminal liability. Next to be addressed is the 
relatively recent academic discussion of whether or not criminal liability is absolved where 
precaution is used during sexual activity. It is also clear that debate about the criminalisation of 
reckless transmission of disease takes place within a broader policy framework, which seeks to 
protect the public and promote openness and honesty, but also to discourage the stigmatisation 
of those suffering from diseases such as HIV. 
 
1 The Principle of ‘Informed Consent’ 
The case of R v Konzani held that if the defendant has unprotected sexual intercourse with the 
complainant and recklessly transmits the HIV virus, consent will only be available as a defence if 
the victim has given ‘informed consent’ to the risk. In Konzani, Judge LJ said: 
If an individual who knows that he is suffering from the HIV virus conceals this stark fact 
from his sexual partner, the principle of her personal autonomy is not enhanced if he is 
exculpated when he recklessly transmits the HIV virus to her through consensual sexual 
                                            
5 Statutory definition of Section 20 OAPA 1861 ‘Whosoever shall unlawfully and maliciously wound or 
inflict any grievous bodily harm upon any other person’ 
6 [1997] 3 W.L.R. 534. 
7 [2004] EWCA Crim 1103, Judge LJ at para.30. 
8 Ibid. 
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intercourse. On any view, the concealment of this fact from her almost inevitably means 
that she is deceived. Her consent is not properly informed, and she cannot give an 
informed consent to something of which she is ignorant.9 
 
The principle of informed consent has been discussed at great length by various academics. 
Cherkassky suggests that an individual is not free to make a choice until he or she knows every 
single detail about the conduct to which he or she is consenting.10 Herring suggests that consent 
would be vitiated ‘if at the time of the sexual activity a person is mistaken to the fact; and had s/he 
known the truth about that fact, would not have consented to it’.11 However, on this basis consent 
would be absent where the defendant was untruthful about certain attributes such as, his infected 
status, his age, his wealth or his future intentions. If the victim was to say that she would not have 
consented to sexual intercourse had she known the defendant had no intention of a future 
relationship, under Herring’s theory the defendant would be liable for rape. Hyman Gross takes 
the view that sex is still consented to, and that the immoral intentions of the defendant should not 
be placed on an elevated moral place for us to judge and punish.12 Moreover, Herring’s principle 
of informed consent is simply not practical. This is because it could lead to an increase in the 
number of rape charges, in cases where consent is currently legally valid, despite the immoral 
intentions of the defendant.  
 
The Court of Appeal in Konzani also felt it important to distinguish between running a risk and 
consenting to running that particular risk. It was noted that the prosecution must establish that the 
complainant, ‘did not willingly consent to the risk of suffering the infection, in the sense of her 
having consciously thought about it at the time and decided to run it’.13 Also, if at any point the 
complainant thought about the risk of contracting HIV, yet decided to take the risk, the appellant 
should be acquitted.  
 
Konzani also illustrates that even in the absence of disclosure from the defendant himself, the 
victim may have still given informed consent to the risk of transmission of disease. This could 
arise where the victim, unknown to the defendant, was made aware of the defendant’s condition 
                                            
9 [2005] EWCA Crim 706, Judge LJ at para.42. 
10 Cherkassky, L., ‘Being Informed: the complexities of knowledge, deception and consent when 
transmitting HIV’, (2010) 74(3) Journal of Criminal Law 242 at p.243. 
11 Herring, J., Great Debates in Criminal Law, (2015), at p.109 
12 Gross, H., ‘Rape, Moralism, and Human Rights’, (2007) Criminal Law Review 222 at p.225. 
13 [2005] EWCA Crim 706, Judge LJ at para.35. 
 96 
 
by a third party.14 The knowledge of the victim and the defendant will be examined in detail in due 
course. However, in Konzani there was no evidence to support an argument that the appellant 
honestly believed that any of the three complainants gave informed consent to the risk of 
contracting HIV. Konzani’s supposed belief amounted to no more than an assertion that the 
defendant expected the law to treat the victim’s agreement to unprotected intercourse as consent 
to the risk of infection; this is a mere mistake of law.15 As a result of this, the jury concluded that 
none of the complainants ‘willingly’ or ‘consciously’ consented. Therefore, the Court of Appeal 
was entirely correct in rejecting the defendant’s appeal on this point. 
 
In conclusion, the law remains that when two individuals engage in unprotected sexual 
intercourse, both of whom agree to take the risk of infection, ‘informed consent’ to the risk of 
serious bodily harm will be a defence. If the defendant fails to disclose his infected status and 
infects his sexual partner the defendant will not be liable for rape. But he will be liable under 
section 20 of the OAPA 1861 if informed consent is not found. Informed consent will remain a 
controversial issue because of the different levels of risks undertaken by different types of 
relationships and sexual activities. Issues regarding whether informed consent based solely on 
the knowledge of the victim, without the full disclosure of the defendant will be addressed shortly. 
For now, Konzani is the leading authority on informed consent and the reckless transmission of 
disease.   
 
2 Knowledge, Recklessness and Wilful Blindness 
The level of knowledge the defendant and the victim have plays an important factor in the 
criminalisation of the reckless transmission of disease. How can an individual be found criminally 
liable for transmitting a disease that he had no idea he was carrying? What if the defendant knew 
that he may be HIV positive, but fails to get himself tested? The victim’s knowledge also raises 
key points for discussion. What if the victim had learnt that her sexual partner was HIV positive 
from a third party unbeknown to the defendant, yet turned a blind eye to the risk of contracting 
the disease? In these circumstances, should the victim hold some responsibility for the 
transmission of disease? Questions similar to these have been raised by case law and numerous 
academics and will now be critically analysed and discussed. First, it is important to understand 
                                            
14 Ibid, Judge LJ at para.44. 
15 Pedain, A., ‘HIV and responsible sexual behaviour’, (2005) 64(3) Cambridge Law Journal 540 
at p.542. 
 97 
 
the legal meaning of recklessness. This is crucial because an individual cannot be found liable 
for recklessly transmitting a disease without the required level of criminal recklessness.  
 
i) Knowledge of the defendant 
Where transmission of disease occurs the defendant must be proved to have acted recklessly. If 
the defendant was not aware of his HIV positive status he may not be found to have acted 
recklessly because there was a lack of foreseeability of harm. However, what level of knowledge 
must the defendant have of his own HIV status to be considered criminally reckless for the 
transmission of disease? 
 
It has long been established that the defendant must have some knowledge of his HIV status in 
order to be reckless in transmitting it. However, it is left unclear whether or not this needs to be 
‘actual knowledge’,16 or if other levels of knowledge will also allow liability to be imposed. Weait 
suggests that in order to be subjectively reckless in the transmission of disease, the defendant 
must have actual knowledge of his HIV positive status. Weait submitted that ‘a subjective 
approach to recklessness must mean an awareness of the risk of causing some degree of bodily 
harm, for which a necessary condition is a person’s actual knowledge of their HIV positive 
status’.17 Spencer on the other hand is certain that criminal liability for the reckless transmission 
of disease should not be restricted to actual knowledge of the defendant’s status. Spencer 
submitted his so called ‘illuminating conclusion’. 
to infect an unsuspecting person with a grave disease you know you have, or may have, 
by behaviour that you know involves a risk of transmission, and that you know you could 
easily modify to reduce or eliminate the risk, is to harm another in ways that is both 
needless and callous. For that reason, criminal liability is justified unless there are strong 
countervailing reasons. In my view there are not.18  
 
In the case of Dica, the level of knowledge the defendant had was not discussed in depth because 
it was proved that the defendant knew he was HIV positive. Judge L.J. made reference to 
                                            
16 Actual knowledge of HIV positive status refers to the defendant having been given a medical 
diagnosis after a blood sample test. This will give the defendant certainty that he is HIV positive 
rather than a mere suspicion. 
17 Weait, M., ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica’, (2005) 68 (1) 
Modern Law Review 121 at p.131. 
18 Spencer, JR., ‘Liability for Reckless Infection: Part 2’, (2004) 154 New Law Journal 448 at 
p.471. 
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Spencer’s ‘illuminating conclusion’19 on recklessness mentioned above. This appears to indicate 
that the court in Dica was prepared to accept Spencer’s broader interpretation of the level of 
knowledge required for reckless transmission of disease. Spencer’s broader interpretation 
includes actual knowledge and knowledge that the defendant may be infected. However, in Judge 
L.J.’s concluding comments he appears to favour a narrower approach: 
 
knowing that they are suffering HIV or some other serious sexual disease, recklessly 
transmits it through consensual sexual intercourse, and inflicts grievous bodily harm on a 
person from who the risk is concealed and who is not consenting to it.20  
 
Confusion arises as Judge L.J. fails to mention that the defendant can have knowledge that he 
may be HIV positive, he only makes reference to the defendant knowing he is HIV positive 
contrary to Spencer’s broader approach, suggesting that the narrower approach should be 
followed.  
 
Weait contends that Judge L.J.’s use of the word ‘knowing’ in his concluding comments was a 
rejection of Spencer’s ‘illuminating conclusion’.21 Further, Weait and Azad add that acceptance of 
Spencer’s ‘illuminating conclusion’ could be somewhat discriminatory. It could infer that members 
of high prevalence groups (such as, homosexual men, injecting drug users and people from sub-
Saharan Africa) ought to suspect that they are, or may be HIV positive, when in fact they might 
have no idea of their HIV status.22  
 
The case of Barnes23 makes reference to the decision in Dica and whether or not knowledge 
should be restricted to actual knowledge. Lord Woolf, stated ‘this court held that the man would 
be guilty of an offence…if being aware of his condition, he had sexual intercourse with them 
without disclosing his condition’.24 The crucial point to note is the use of the word “aware”. Lord 
Woolf appears to have adopted the narrow approach of knowledge, as there is no mention of the 
defendant being aware that he may be carrying the HIV virus. In the case of Konzani it was stated 
                                            
19 [2004] Q.B. 1257, Judge, LJ at para.55. 
20 Ibid, Judge, LJ at para.59.  
21 Weait, ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica’, at p.131. 
22 Weait, M., and Azad, Y., ‘The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission in England and Wales: 
Questions of Law and Policy’, (2005) 10 HIV/AIDS Policy & Law Review p.6. 
23 [2005] 1 W.L.R. 910. 
24 Ibid, Lord Woolf at para.10. 
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that ‘if an individual who knows that he is suffering from the HIV virus conceals this stark fact’.25 
Again, there is no mention of the defendant’s knowledge that he may be HIV positive. 
 
Weait and Azad, in their 2005 HIV/AIDS Policy and Law Review26 article appear to make the 
assumption that the lack of discussion about the defendant’s knowledge in Dica and Konzani, 
indicates that the only type of knowledge that will be accepted is ‘actual knowledge’. Ryan 
contends that the lack of discussion in the cases of Dica and Konzani was because both 
defendants had actual knowledge of their HIV positive status. Therefore, it can be argued that the 
courts did not need to discuss whether anything less than actual knowledge would have sufficed.27 
In addition, it is important to note the unreported case of R v Adaye.28 In this case the defendant 
was strongly advised by his doctor that he may be HIV positive. The defendant failed to get himself 
tested29 and his new partner contracted the HIV virus. Adaye pleaded guilty to the reckless 
transmission of disease and was sentenced to six years imprisonment. Judge Lynch in Adaye 
was reported by the media as stating that the defendant, ‘knew it was highly likely, if not certain, 
that [he was] HIV positive’.30 This suggests that actual knowledge is not the only level of 
knowledge required to be criminally liable for reckless transmission of disease. A broader degree 
of knowledge similar to Spencer’s previous suggestion appears to have been applied in this case.  
 
However, the legal weight and strength of the case of Adaye must be questioned. According to 
Dodds et al,31 none of the legal complexities in Adaye had been reported. It is also unclear if there 
was any scientific evidence that the HIV strain32 of the complainant was the same as the 
                                            
25 [2005] EWCA Crim 706, Judge LJ at para.42. 
26 Weait and Azad ‘The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission in England and Wales: at p.5. 
27 Ryan, S., ‘Reckless transmission of HIV: knowledge and culpability’, (2006) Criminal Law 
Review 981 at p.984. 
28 The Times, 10 January 2004. 
29 This is known as the ‘willful blindness’ (discussed below). 
30 HIV bigamist jailed for infections, BBC News, 12 January 2004 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/england/merseyside/3389735.stm. 
31 Dodds, C., et al., ‘Grievous Harm: Use of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 for 
Sexual Transmission of HIV’, (2005) Project Report. Sigma Research p.26-27. 
32 There are many different strains of the HIV virus, some more popular in particular countries 
than others, the most popular HIV sub-type in the UK is Sub-type B. 
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defendant’s. In addition to this, it has been widely reported in the media33 that Adaye’s first wife34 
contacted Adaye in 2002 to inform him of her HIV positive status. This would suggest to some the 
assumption that Adaye was also HIV positive. This assumption should not have been made 
because Adaye had never been tested. Dodds et al referred to these reports as ‘erroneous’ and 
that apparently the judge in the trial ordered that newspapers correct this misinformation, yet there 
is no evidence that any correction was ever published.35 All considered, Adaye remains useful in 
the sense that it gives commentators an idea of how the courts may react to similar circumstances 
found in Adaye. Admittedly the validity of the case is questionable, but there is little else available 
to satisfy the inquisitiveness of this discussion.  
 
Further legal guidance on the level of knowledge required by the defendant can be found in the 
CPS guidelines on the reckless transmission of disease. Here, it is stated that ‘it is possible that, 
on rare occasions, a person can know that he or she is infected without undergoing the necessary 
medical tests’.36 This provides substantial evidence that actual knowledge is not in fact 
necessarily required and is a question for the jury to decide so the consistency of this approach 
may vary. The CPS also state that, ‘those who choose not to be tested will not necessarily avoid 
prosecution, if all the circumstances point to the fact that they knew they were infected’. This 
contributes further evidence that actual knowledge is not required and knowledge can be found 
by alternative means other than medical testing.  
 
ii) Wilful Blindness  
The case of Adaye also raises another issue; the ‘wilful blindness’ of the defendant. In the context 
of reckless transmission of disease, the case of Adaye suggests that when a defendant knows he 
is at high risk of carrying the HIV virus yet decides not to get himself tested, this will be equivalent 
to actual knowledge. If the narrow approach to knowledge was used in Adaye, the defendant 
would not have been criminally liable because he failed to get tested. Although not widely 
                                            
33 Bigamist passed HIV recklessly, The Guardian, 13 January 2004   
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2004/jan/13/southafrica.aids. 
34 Adaye had bigamously married two women, the first remained in South Africa, whilst he 
married and infected another women living in the UK. 
35 Dodds, ‘Grievous Harm: Use of the Offences against the Person Act 1861 for Sexual 
Transmission of HIV’, pp.26-27. 
36 The Crown Prosecution Service ‘Intentional or Reckless Sexual Transmission of Infection’  
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/intentional_or_reckless_sexual_transmission_of_infection_g
uidance/. 
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considered by academics, the concept of wilful blindness in relation to reckless transmission of 
disease has shown some signs of acceptance. Spencer explains that by imposing liability only 
where actual knowledge is established discourages those who think that they may be infected, 
from getting themselves tested.37 Whereas, imposing liability on those with knowledge that they 
may be HIV positive could actually encourage people to get themselves tested. However, 
Chalmers believes this is unlikely to have any effect on testing because of the lack of 
understanding of the law by the general public.38 Sullivan, agrees that wilful blindness should 
equate to actual knowledge. Sullivan opines that a person who is wilfully blind to their HIV status 
is just as morally blameworthy as those with actual knowledge of their status.39 This is true to a 
certain extent. In Adaye it seems that the defendant was virtually certain he was HIV positive and 
could arguably be just as blameworthy as a defendant with actual knowledge. Conversely, there 
are a number of reasons why reckless transmission of disease should not be based on wilful 
blindness of the defendant. 
 
Imposing liability for the reckless transmission of disease based on wilful blindness could be seen 
as widening the offence too far. Turner suggests that if actual knowledge is not required, then 
every individual who has ever had unprotected sex and who has not received a negative HIV test 
result, would potentially be liable.40 This is an alarming point as those who genuinely have no 
knowledge they are HIV positive could be caught in the net of criminal liability if they have 
previously engaged in unsafe sex. In response, Chalmers attempted to narrow this broad position 
by suggesting that liability should only be imposed where there is a serious risk of being HIV 
positive.41 This may not be the most practical approach. The level of seriousness could never be 
accurately measured for the reason that the risk of HIV transmission varies between different 
sexual activities. 
 
The CPS offer useful guidance in relation to whether wilful blindness equates to knowledge for 
the transmission of disease. Referred to as ‘closing of the mind’ the CPS state that ‘a deliberate 
                                            
37 Spencer, ‘Liability for Reckless Infection: Part 2’, at p.471. 
38 Chalmers, J., ‘The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission’, (2002) 28 Journal of Medical Ethics 
160 at p.161. 
39 Sullivan, G.R., ‘Knowledge, Belief and Culpability’, in Shute, S., and Simester, A., Criminal 
Law Theory: Doctrines of the General Part, (2002), at p.213. 
40 Turner, A., ‘Criminal Liability and AIDS’, (1995) 7 Auckland University Law Review 875 at 
p.889. 
41 Chalmers, ‘The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission’, at p.162. 
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closing of the mind by not undergoing testing may be a factor that a jury can take into account 
when deciding the question of the defendant’s knowledge’.42 The CPS also offer circumstances 
where closing of the mind may be found. First, where the defendant has been given a preliminary 
diagnosis and fails to undertake the confirmatory test. Second, where the defendant shows 
symptoms associated with the sexual infection which must lead to the defendant knowing of his 
condition. Finally, where a defendant knows that a previous sexual partner has been diagnosed 
with a condition, this could be evidence of the defendant knowing he is infected. These examples 
are similar to those discussed earlier for establishing knowledge. However, in the context of wilful 
blindness the CPS make is clear that these examples may only be relied upon in exceptional 
cases, to prove wilful blindness as actual knowledge.    
 
This leads to the next argument that wilful blindness should not equate to actual knowledge. It 
would be unclear when an individual becomes wilfully blind. Does an individual become wilfully 
blind after one unprotected sexual encounter or ten unprotected sexual encounters? It would be 
difficult, if not impossible to pinpoint exactly when one becomes wilfully blind to having knowledge 
of their HIV positive status.  
 
The final and perhaps the most effective argument, questions the legal practicality of imposing 
liability in the absence of actual knowledge. Ryan raised the point that for a successful charge 
under section 20 of the OAPA 1861, the defendant must have been proved to have transmitted 
the disease. But how can it be proved that the defendant transmitted the disease when there is 
no medical evidence to prove that the defendant is HIV positive? The Court could order a 
compulsory blood test to establish whether or not the defendant is HIV positive at the time of the 
trial. However, this fails to prove that the defendant was HIV positive at the time the complainant 
accused the defendant of transmitting the disease.43 This strongly suggests that the defendant 
should have actual knowledge of his HIV positive status, and that wilful blindness should not be 
sufficient.  
 
It remains unclear whether a defendant can be found criminally liable where he does not have 
actual knowledge of his HIV status. Weait, provides an interesting summary of the current law 
                                            
42 The Crown Prosecution Service ‘Intentional or Reckless Sexual Transmission of Infection’ 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/intentional_or_reckless_sexual_transmission_of_infection_g
uidance/. 
43 Ryan, ‘Reckless transmission of HIV: knowledge and culpability’, at p.988. 
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post Dica. In order to avoid liability for the reckless transmission of disease, first the defendant 
should disclose his HIV status to his sexual partner, this will undoubtedly establish informed 
consent. Alternatively, the defendant should avoid finding out for sure his HIV status, so he cannot 
be held to be reckless.44 However, if Spencer’s ‘illuminating conclusion’ or wilful blindness is 
accepted by the courts, Weait’s latter suggestion may not be effective. Case law such as Dica 
and Konzani has been little help in answering this question. Rather, they have prompted a 
desperate examination of the wording and interpretations undertaken by the court. In addition to 
academic speculation, Adaye appears to offer useful guidance45 as to what can be expected in 
future cases deciding the knowledge of the defendant and his HIV status.  
 
iii) Knowledge of the victim 
Moving onto the victim’s state of knowledge this discussion will be directed from the victim’s point 
of view and the level of knowledge the victim has about the defendant’s HIV status. The case of 
Barnes recognised the rationale in Dica when applying the defence of consent. Lord Woolf 
acknowledged that where the defendant discloses his condition to the woman, he will have a 
defence if the woman was still prepared to accept the risks involved and consented to having 
sexual intercourse with him.46 Weait disagrees with the rationale in Dica by arguing the following 
point.  
[the victim] may be ignorant of a partner’s HIV status in the sense that this has not been 
disclosed to them by him, but to deny the defence if there is in fact knowledge of the risk, 
and a willingness to accept it, would be tantamount to saying that the person infected 
bears no responsibility for their own sexual and physical health.47  
 
This argument was presented by Weait when referring to a case in Cyprus with similar facts to 
Dica. Weait argues that where the infected party denies a HIV positive status, the law ignores the 
victim’s responsibility for her own sexual health. It allows the defendant to hold all legal 
responsibility on something which he could have lied about. Therefore, even when asked by the 
victim and the defendant tells the victim he is HIV negative, the victim is still partly at fault because 
of her willingness to take the risk. Weait submitted, in relation to the victim, the law ignores their 
                                            
44 Weait, ‘Dica: knowledge, consent and the transmission of HIV’, at p.827. 
45 Although it could be argued that Adaye may only be useful for future case law where the 
defendant pleads guilty for the reckless transmission of disease. 
46 [2005] 1 W.L.R. 910, Lord Woolf at para.10. 
47 Weait, ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica’, at p.128. 
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risk-taking, their irresponsibility and legitimates their gullibility.48 Not surprisingly this approach 
has led to strong criticism.  
 
Spencer finds this argument ‘astonishing’ and questions if it is in fact gullible to trust a person with 
whom you are in love when they tell you, they are HIV negative.49 Spencer therefore fails to see 
how the blame can be put on a victim who asks her husband if he is HIV positive, and accepts 
the reply to the negative. Weait rejects Spencer’s comment that his previous argument is 
‘astonishing’. Weait states ‘to punish the person who infects another, where that other is in a 
position to avoid infection and elects to run the risk, simply serves to reinforce the predominant 
view that HIV/AIDS is someone else’s problem’.50 Konzani appears to have followed Dica in that 
full disclosure is required in order to achieve informed consent from the victim.51 Judge L.J. added 
the following criteria. 
By way of example, an individual with HIV may develop a sexual relationship with 
someone who knew him while he was in hospital, receiving treatment for the condition. If 
so, her informed consent, if it were indeed informed, would remain a defence… 
Alternatively, he may honestly believe that his new sexual partner was told of his condition 
by someone known to them both.52 
 
These comments have effectively widened the scope of informed consent, which can now be 
found in the absence of full disclosure. Cherkassky believes, that allowing social interactions to 
establish informed consent contradicts the notion that the defendant must disclose his infected 
status. Without the need for full disclosure the defendant can act recklessly. This ‘places a 
significant burden on the victim to look into the sexual history of his or her partner before 
consenting’.53 Concerns arise from the possible lack of responsibility imposed upon the defendant 
and the lack of incentive to disclose his HIV status. It is at least arguable that in some 
circumstances where it is so obvious to the victim that the defendant is HIV positive, consent to 
the risk could be found in the absence of full disclosure. However, honesty and openness should 
be encouraged, the comments in Konzani appear to give the defendant an unjustifiable means to 
                                            
48 Weait, M., ‘Taking the blame: criminal law, social responsibility and the sexual transmission of 
HIV’, (2001) 23(4) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 441 at p.452. 
49 Spencer, ‘Liability for reckless infection – part 2’, at p.448. 
50 Weait, ‘Criminal Law and the Sexual Transmission of HIV: R v Dica’, at p.129. 
51 [2005] EWCA Crim 706, Judge, LJ at para.42. 
52 Ibid, Judge, LJ at para.44. 
53 Cherkassky, ‘Being Informed: The Complexities of Knowledge, Deception and Consent when 
Transmitting HIV’, at p.254. 
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escape criminal liability, especially if the defendant was unaware of the victim’s knowledge of his 
HIV positive status.  
 
Weait welcomes Judge L.J.’s comments in Konzani and also proposes that it is wrong to allow 
the only source of knowledge of the defendant’s condition to be through direct disclosure from the 
defendant himself as there may be a number of different sources of knowledge. 54 For example, 
the victim being aware that the defendant’s previous partner was HIV positive, or that the 
defendant belongs to a group with a high prevalence of HIV infection. Nevertheless, Weait 
believes that the examples given by Judge L.J. are too limited as both rely on some form of 
disclosure. Either through visible disclosure whilst the victim is at hospital with the defendant, or 
the reliance of the disclosure from a third party. Weait then heavily criticises the criminalisation of 
an individual who infects another person, in the absence of disclosure, where the contracting 
individual was still aware of the potential harm to which they are subjecting themselves to. Weait 
claims that informed consent is given by the very act of engaging in unprotected sexual 
intercourse; ‘it is at least arguable that a person who agrees to have unprotected sex with a person 
about whose HIV status they are uncertain consents to the risk of transmission, by the very act of 
agreeing to having unprotected sex with that person’.55 Such an argument holds valid legal basis 
on the part that there are always risks involved when engaging in unprotected sexual intercourse. 
However, these risks are more likely to be associated with contracting more common curable 
STI’s and possibly unwanted pregnancy. The risk should not be related to the considerably less 
common HIV virus. Therefore, it should not be submitted that by way of engaging in unprotected 
sexual intercourse the victim has automatically consented to the risk of contracting the HIV virus.  
 
Cooper and Reed raised the following question; if the defendant recklessly or intentionally infects 
the victim through an act of sexual intercourse, why should his criminal liability depend upon the 
state of mind of the victim? Cooper and Reed argue that when the defendant recklessly or 
intentionally infects the victim he is acting with moral blameworthiness, moral culpability, and is 
arguably deserving of the stigma of a criminal conviction. It seems somewhat illogical to absolve 
                                            
54 Weait, M., ‘Knowledge, autonomy and consent: R. v Konzani’, (2005) Criminal Law Review 
763 at p.766. 
55 Ibid at p.765. 
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the defendant from liability simply because the victim has acquired knowledge of the defendant’s 
condition, from a source other than the defendant. 56  
 
The current degree of knowledge required by the victim in order to establish informed consent 
appears to have been burst wide open by comments in Konzani. Weait agrees with the broad 
approach mentioned in Konzani and in addition to this Weait would like to see even more 
responsibility placed on the victim’s shoulders. This seems hard to come to terms with because, 
by not disclosing his infected status, the defendant has been deceptive and positively concealed 
his condition. This in law should not be overseen just because there may or may not have been 
other means available for the victim to gain knowledge of the defendant’s positive HIV status. 
Finally, it should not be agreed upon that an unsuspecting victim who contracts a life threatening 
disease should share the same responsibility, as a result of the criminally reckless actions of 
another. 
 
3 Precaution and Disclosure 
i) Precaution as a defence in England and Wales 
The current English law criminalises an individual under the OAPA 1861 who recklessly transmits 
the HIV virus to an unsuspecting sexual partner but it has been held that where an individual 
discloses his condition to the complainant, who then gives an informed consent to the risk of 
transmission of disease, the defendant may avoid liability.57 In recent academic discussion, it has 
been suggested that there may be an alternative approach to absolving a defendant’s liability. It 
has been argued that taking precaution with the use of condoms, undergoing medical treatment 
and taking part in low risk activities may also act as a defence.  
 
Chalmers indicated that the use of condoms among serodiscordant58 couples has been found to 
reduce the annual HIV incidence by 69%59. Condom use as a defence can be seen as a public 
health initiative to prevent the transmission of HIV as it can significantly reduce the risk of 
transmission and promote safe sex practices. There has been both judicial authority and 
academic discussion to suggest that condom use is a defence to the reckless transmission of 
                                            
56 Cooper, S., and Reed, A., ‘Informed Consent and the Transmission of Sexual Disease: 
Dadson Revivified’, (2007) 71(5) Journal of Criminal Law 461 at p.464. 
57 R v Dica [2004] EWCA Crim 1103, R v Konzani [2005] EWCA Crim 706. 
58 A couple where one of the two are infected with the HIV virus and the other is not. 
59 Chalmers, ‘The criminalisation of HIV transmission’, at p.162. 
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HIV. Uncertainty arises when establishing whether or not the disclosure of the defendant’s 
positive status is required alongside the practice of safe sex. There is currently no case law 
available where the use of a condom has been considered a defence for the reckless transmission 
of disease. This is not to say that the defence has not been discussed by the courts.   
 
In Dica, notable comments were made suggesting that the use of a condom could possibly be a 
defence. Judge L.J. stated ‘if protective measures had been taken by the appellant that would 
have provided material relevant to the jury’s decision whether, in all the circumstances, 
recklessness was proved’.60 Judge L.J. in Dica suggested that if precautions were taken (such as 
the use of a condom) this could potentially lower the risk of transmission to a level where 
recklessness cannot be found by the jury. This should not be interpreted as an automatic defence 
for the reckless transmission of disease, but merely something for the jury to consider.  
Looking back at Judge L.J’s example of the hypothetical Roman Catholic couple, who due to their 
religious beliefs cannot use contraception the final sentence states ‘at the peril of criminal 
sanctions, [should the couple] choose between bringing their sexual relationship to an end or 
violate their consciences by using contraception?’61 This appears to suggest that if the Roman 
Catholic couple were to break their religious beliefs and practice safe sexual intercourse, the use 
of a condom would excuse any risk of recklessly transmitting HIV.  
 
In Konzani, the defendant was held to be reckless because he failed to use contraception every 
time he had sexual intercourse with the three complainants.62 The court therefore failed to give 
any indication of the effect the use of a condom would have on a defendant’s criminal liability. 
This leaves the current law open to the possibility that even where a condom is used during sexual 
intercourse the defendant can still be found criminally liable for transmitting disease. The CPS 
shed some light in their prosecution guidelines.63 The CPS suggest that it is highly unlikely that a 
suspect will be found reckless if the suspect took appropriate safeguards during their relationship. 
If it can be shown that the suspect knew he was not using adequate safeguards against the 
transmission of disease, recklessness will be found. The court in Dica and the CPS both suggest 
                                            
60 [2004] EWCA Crim 1103, Judge LJ at para.11. 
61 Ibid, Judge LJ at para.49. 
62 This was admitted by the defendant, see [2005] EWCA Crim 706, Judge, LJ para.4. 
63 Crown Prosecution Service ‘Intention or Reckless Sexual Transmission of Infection’ 
http://www.cps.gov.uk/legal/h_to_k/intentional_or_reckless_sexual_transmission_of_infection_g
uidance/. 
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that when precautions are taken, liability may not be found. However, it can be argued that the 
risk that remains present when using condoms is still sufficient to find the defendant criminally 
reckless.  
 
In order to prove recklessness for the purposes of criminal liability, the prosecution must prove 
that the defendant took an unjustifiable risk. If the risk can be considered justifiable, recklessness 
cannot be proved. When calculating whether or not a risk is justifiable the factors that can be 
taken into account are the likelihood of harm, and the precautions used by the defendant. All 
sexual activity is likely to carry some risk, hence the argument that the law should only be 
concerned with activities that pose a high risk.64 Equally, the risks involved with unprotected 
sexual intercourse can be significantly reduced by practicing safe sex, even to a point where the 
risks are considered insignificant.  
It has been found that vaginal sexual intercourse with a condom lowers the risk of HIV 
transmission to as low as 1 in 10,00065 for the female partner and 1 in 20,000 for the male 
partner.66 Harker and Wright suggest that this medical evidence should be a strong indication that 
where precautions are taken, the risk of transmitting HIV should be too low for criminal liability to 
be imposed.67 Hughes proposes that when precautions are used the defendant is being 
responsible, not reckless in his conduct.68 Ryan adds, the aim of any sort of measure taken 
against those who spread HIV is to prevent the further spread of HIV. It would be 
counterproductive to punish those who take precautionary steps to avoid spreading the disease.69 
These may be valid points, however, it does not address the issue that the victim is still being 
subjected to a slight degree of risk. Bronitt is of the view that ‘notwithstanding preventative 
                                            
64 Harker, K., and Wright, E., ‘The HIV stigma: duty or defence’, (2015) 4(1) UCL Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence 55 at p.66. 
65 Pinkerton, S., and Abramson, P., ‘Effectiveness of Condoms in preventing HIV transmission’, 
(1997) 44 Social Science and Medicine 1303 at p.1310 – the figure 1 in 10,000 is described 
here as 0.0001. 
66 Galletly, C., and Pinkerton, S., ‘Toward Rational HIV Exposure Laws’, (2004) 32 Journal of 
Law, Medicine and Ethics 327 at p.328. 
67 Harker, K., and Wright, E., ‘The HIV stigma: duty or defence’, (2015) 4(1) UCL Journal of Law 
and Jurisprudence 55 at p.66. 
68 Hughes, D., ‘Condom Use, Viral Load and the Type of Sexual Activity as Defences to the 
Sexual Transmission of HIV’ (2013) 77 Journal of Criminal Law 136 at p.140. 
69 Ryan, S., ‘Risk-taking, Recklessness and HIV transmission: Accommodating the reality of 
sexual transmission of HIV within a justifiable approach to criminal liability’, (2007) Liverpool 
Law Review 215 at p.229. 
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measures, the person transmitting the disease could nevertheless foresee a risk (however 
insubstantial or remote) that the disease may be passed on by his or her conduct’.70 Furthermore, 
Bronitt argues that although precautions may make infected sexual intercourse ‘safer’, there is 
still no method of completely eliminating the risk and therefore recklessness should still be found. 
 
ii) Moral and Legal Duty of Disclosure 
In English law, if a HIV positive individual uses prophylactic measures (such as, a condom), does 
he have any legal or moral obligations to disclose his HIV status? Or is the risk sufficiently low 
that he does not have a legal duty to disclose his status before engaging in sexual activity? The 
duty of disclosure alongside the use of condoms has sparked much academic debate in English 
law. The moral based argument that there should always be a duty to disclose is well supported. 
Prosecuting counsel in the trial of Konzani illustrated this point to the jury. The prosecutor stated 
that HIV ‘is at the top of the list of things you would want to be told by a prospective sexual partner, 
isn’t it, I am HIV positive. Have sex with me and you’re taking your life, or putting your life in very 
substantial risk indeed’.71 Weait believes that the prosecution in Konzani ignored the legal basis 
in which they should have been prosecuting. First, they presented to the jury that transmitting the 
HIV virus results in imminent mortality, which is not the case, especially with proper medical 
treatment. Secondly, the prosecutor assumed that the victim had not consented to contracting the 
virus. When in legal terms it is not the infection that is consented to, it is the risk of infection. 
Finally, the prosecution ignored the fact that it is only certain kinds of sexual activity that carry a 
risk of transmission. Weait believes that the Crown prosecutor in Konzani failed to present a legal 
case against the defendant before the jury.72 However, the legality of the case which the 
prosecution puts before the jury was inevitably going to be questioned. The key points that remain 
are that three women are now infected with the deadly HIV virus, as a result of Konzani’s failure 
to disclose his condition and use precautionary measures. It was decided correctly that the three 
victims could not have given informed consent without disclosure, leading to the 10-year sentence 
of imprisonment imposed on Feston Konzani.  
 
                                            
70 Bronitt, S., ‘Spreading disease and the criminal law’, (1994) Criminal Law Review 21 at p.30. 
71 Weait, M., Intimacy and Responsibility: The Criminalisation of HIV Transmission (2007) 
p.188-189. 
72 Quoted in Weait, Intimacy and Responsibility, p.189. 
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It is believed by some73 that the disclosure of HIV positive status comes with potential risks that 
greatly outweigh the minimal risk imposed upon the uninfected party. The stigma and 
discrimination that can be associated with disclosure means that disclosure is not always as 
straightforward as it may seem.74 Disclosure may come with the admission of sexual infidelity, 
rape, or drug use75 not to mention the risk that others may be informed of the individual’s HIV 
positive status.76 There are also concerns that disclosure may lead to personal violence especially 
in cases with female infected parties. Judicial support of these arguments comes from the case 
of Dica where Judge L.J. stated that ‘there are significant negative consequences of disclosure 
of HIV’.77 The potential negative impacts of disclosure have led to the opinion that disclosure 
should only be necessary in cases of deliberate risk taking during unprotected sexual 
intercourse.78 In addition to this, when the sexual activity is protected and the risk is low, ‘it is 
possible to act in a responsible and morally justifiable way without forewarning’.79 The emotional 
and psychological burden that comes with disclosing an infected status can be recognised with 
understanding. Greater concern should be placed on the uninfected party whose personal sexual 
health has been decided upon by someone other than themselves. 
 
One’s sexual health is generally a personal matter. The proposal that one’s sexual health can 
effectively be decided upon by another person is immoral and unjust. This is well supported by 
Bruner who upholds that withholding information about one’s HIV infection from a sexual partner 
is morally disrespectful because everyone is entitled to make his or her own decisions about 
sexual risks.80 The use of precaution does not destroy the right of personal autonomy an 
uninfected person has, regardless of the minimal risk involved. The suggestion of one sided risk 
                                            
73 Ryan, S., ‘Disclosure and HIV transmission’, (2015) Journal of Criminal Law 395; Harker and 
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74 Ryan, ‘Disclosure and HIV transmission’, at p.401. 
75 Harker and Wright,  ‘The HIV stigma: duty or defence’, at p.72. 
76 Ryan, , ‘Disclosure and HIV transmission’, at p.401. 
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taking decisions has been considered ‘ethically indefensible’,81 as it does not allow the opportunity 
for the sexual partner to decide what level of risk is acceptable to them. Field and Sullivan agree 
that the use of precautions ought not to be a sufficient defence unless the infected person has 
informed his partner of his condition.82 It is also fair to assume that even protected intercourse 
with a HIV positive individual is something that most uninfected people would shy away from.83 
This may be seen as discriminatory in nature, however, it still remains a personal choice of the 
uninfected party. Gostin and Hodge add that, ‘while a partner is free to consent to or refuse sex, 
that choice is meaningless unless it is made with reasonable knowledge of the risks’.84 Stein 
encourages a sympathetic view of the infected individual and that disclosure may mean that a 
desired sexual encounter will not happen.85 This argument is absurd and defies any respect for 
the personal autonomy of the uninfected partner. It places the sexual gratification of the infected 
partner above the health and wellbeing of the uninfected partner. An argument that has no legal 
or moral stand in this discussion. Chalmers raises the argument that short of abstinence, condom 
use is the best way to prevent the spread of HIV.86 Condoms have been a hugely significant factor 
in the prevention of the spread of HIV. However, for the infected individual the only other choice 
apart from disclosure should indeed be abstinence. The argument that disclosure compromises 
an infected individual’s rights to sexual freedom87 is wholly rejected. It is submitted that the 
personal autonomy rights of the uninfected individual greatly outweigh the sexual gratification of 
the infected person.  
It could be unreasonable to suggest that all non-disclosure cases are due to cowardice or 
prioritizing one’s own sexual needs over another’s health. It is understood that disclosure may 
come with undesired social and emotional difficulties and that not all non-disclosers are sexual 
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pariahs.88 However, regardless of the minute risk of transmission that may come with protected 
sexual intercourse, the sexual partner must surely be entitled to a choice as to whether that small 
risk is taken. The Law Commission state ‘consent to intercourse implies consent to the normal 
level of risk, and in the cases with which we are concerned (use of condom) the level of risk is no 
more than normal, and may be less’.89 This may be true and there is no doubt there is a moral 
duty of disclosure, however the legal duty is not so easily decided. The risk of transmission 
remains extremely low during protected sexual intercourse, this may in fact legally negate 
recklessness. The conflict between legal and moral duties to disclose is a conflict which legality 
is more likely to prevail. However, one would hope that an infected individual would place the 
health and autonomy of their sexual partner on a higher pedestal than their own sexual desires.  
 
Conclusion 
There is no doubt that the current law on the reckless transmission of disease lacks certainty and 
clarity. The willingness to consent to a potentially life threatening risk, the state of mind of both 
the defendant and the victim and the precautionary measures taken, are examples of crucial 
considerations to be made before criminal liability is imposed. The defence of consent remains a 
contentious issue which the criminal law has struggled to set a firm grasp upon. As the current 
law stands, where an individual transmits a serious disease to his sexual partner the defendant 
will not be charged with rape. Rather the defendant will be charged with inflicting grievous bodily 
harm with the defence of consent available, if such consent was informed. Maintaining personal 
autonomy has been a recurring theme throughout this discussion. Knowledge and disclosure 
have been the main areas for this debate. The required knowledge of the defendant appears to 
be moving away from ‘actual knowledge’, as does the knowledge of victim appear to be moving 
away from direct disclosure.  
 
It is argued that it is unjustified to convict individuals who do not have actual knowledge of their 
HIV infection. This approach fails to convict those who should know they are at high risk of being 
infected, and have the means to reduce that risk. It is unfortunate that Judge L.J. in Dica omitted 
to mention the possibility that the defendant can have knowledge that he may be HIV positive and 
still be criminally liable. This should not be seen as a victory for those who support actual 
knowledge being the only form of knowledge that is relevant in this context. The defendant in Dica 
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knew he was HIV positive so the discussion of knowledge was inadequate and somewhat 
unhelpful. The case of Adaye and the acceptance of wilful blindness by the CPS suggest actual 
knowledge of HIV infection may no longer be required. A concept that Weait90 and Spencer91 
clash over. It is submitted that Spencer’s ‘illuminating conclusion’ on the defendant’s knowledge 
shows positive signs of future judicial acceptance. Acceptance that will be pleasantly welcomed, 
therefore broadening the net of liability for those who deliberately fail to get themselves tested.  
 
The required knowledge of the victim shows far more judicial precedent and support. Konzani 
ruled that in the absence of full disclosure informed consent can still be found.92 This was 
welcomed by Weait,93 yet he remains unsatisfied and requires an even broader approach. Weait 
contends that informed consent for transmission of disease should be found by every person who 
engages in unprotected sexual intercourse and lacks knowledge of their HIV negative status.94 
Weait seems to want to restrict the scope of liability imposed against the defendant and transfer 
the burden of responsibility to the victim. This would be an unjustifiable shift of responsibility. 
There should only be one way in which informed consent is created: where the defendant fully 
discloses his HIV positive status and the victim chooses to continue with sexual activity. Konzani 
was wrong to suggest that there can be other means of disclosure as it has given even more 
reason for the defendant to keep his condition hidden or escape liability. It is accepted that there 
are some cases where disclosure may not be an option. For example, where violence is feared. 
However, the criminal law provides other safeguards for such circumstances. Disclosure from the 
defendant should be encouraged because the infected party has a strong moral duty of protection 
towards his or her sexual partner. A duty that should be recognised and respected with openness 
and honesty.  
 
The use of precaution further confuses the principle of disclosure and recklessness. The case of 
Dica95 and the CPS96 show positive guidance that the use a condom will act as a defence. It has 
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been argued to be counterproductive to punish those who take precautionary measures to 
minimise the risk of transmission.97 This argument can be accepted to some extent but only in 
circumstances where there is disclosure of infection. Disclosure effectively creates an informed 
consent. Unprotected sexual intercourse with a HIV positive partner is never advised, but the use 
of a condom, disclosure and consent can be accepted as a defence. It is disagreed that using a 
condom justifies the lack of disclosure. It is of the upmost importance that the uninfected partner 
is fully informed as to whether precautionary measures are used and the level of risk they are 
putting themselves at.  
 
The issues of consent, knowledge, disclosure and precaution are all closely linked. The 
discussion of one will always need consideration of the other. The defence of consent is the only 
recent legally certain aspect of transmission of disease. Dica and Konzani have created the 
defence of informed consent. Konzani widened the defence to include non-disclosure leaving the 
victim exposed and at risk. Whilst different academics agree or disagree with the comments made 
in Konzani one thing is true. The defendant’s responsibility for the sexual health of his sexual 
partners has been reduced dramatically. In light of recent developments in this area of the law, ‘a 
defendant has plenty of freedom to manoeuvre, while the victim has very little’.98  
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